


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*FOR HARRY FITZGERALD
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL*

20 June 1980

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Frank Carlucci
Deputy DCI

FROM:

RE: IG's Report on the Recruiting System

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1. General comment. I have seen a lot of IG-type reports over the past 25 years, and this is one of the very best...thorough, rigorous, comprehensive, but also fair and even-handed, constructive...most amazing of all, always to the point, and even quite readable. However, I should note that a great many of the observations and judgments reflected in this particular IG Report are directly in line with numerous ideas that I have conveyed to Stan Turner since early in 1977, so it is possible that my laudatory reaction to this IG Report is at least in part because I see support for much of what I have been suggesting over three years.

2. Educational backgrounds of recruits. One point that I did not find elaborated in this IG Report is any commentary on the particular kind of educational backgrounds that are most appropriate for various career tracks. I have dealt with this matter at some length in earlier memos for the DCI in recent years--memos that I suppose are still in your files, if anyone should care to dig them out for a re-read. For example, in connection with the new emphasis on long-range trend analysis, I have argued that it would be preferable (and also for other good reasons) to seek out people with high-quality M.A.-level degrees from multi- (or inter-) disciplinary programs, in contrast to people with Ph.D.-level degrees in single disciplines. I will not dwell on this point at any length in this current memo, but I am willing to discuss it should anyone be interested. As a broad generalization, I would tend to recommend multidisciplinary people over the narrow-gauge unidisciplinary specialists in almost all areas, even science and engineering fields...although recognizing that exceptions to this rule of thumb will be important.

3. How people get interested in the Agency. I was struck by the comment on page 46 and repeated elsewhere in this report, that over 50% of the new hires have indicated that their interest in the Agency was first prompted by an Agency employee, friend, colleague, professor, or relative. Well, obviously, it's fairly hard to pinpoint "friends, colleagues, and relatives" for more emphasis in the recruiting process. But, if these five categories of people are the best stimulators of interest in working for the Agency, it should be possible to focus new attention on two of these categories: Agency employees, and professors.

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4. Agency employees as recruiters. First, let me note that I very strongly agree with the recommendation in this IG Report that recruiting be converted over into a line activity. I support everything said in this report on this point.

However, I think it might be possible to go even a bit further. For example, particularly for clerical hires, given that most of these tend to come from the greater Washington area in any case, it might be possible to borrow some ideas from the armed forces--the kind of idea reflected in slogans such as "every soldier a recruiter." Incentive and reward programs could be established for current clerical employees in connection with their efforts as recruiters in their off-duty spare time when they have opportunities to mention the Agency among their friends and associates. This idea would be far less appropriate in recruiting professional personnel, who tend to be (and certainly ought to be) drawn from a nationwide base. Nevertheless, your current professional personnel in many cases probably maintain contacts with friends and colleagues nationwide, through professional societies and school alumni organizations and in other contexts. Therefore, efforts to encourage all current employees to join in the recruiting effort should be worth exploring, although it would have to be handled somewhat differently for people in different contexts and categories.

5. Agency "alumni" as recruiters. Here's a new idea for you, not discovered by me in the IG Report but an extension of the concept of using employees as recruiters in a line arrangement.

The best universities, colleges and service academies make heavy use of duly designated alumni groups for recruiting. I see no reason why the Agency could not do the same, although within a carefully constructed set of guidelines. The Agency "alumni" are mainly the retired people--and preferably those who have retired quite recently. I am assuming that you have retirees living in most parts of the United States but--even if there are gaps--you could use the ones you do have in areas where recruiting could be enhanced. I would suggest the following guidelines:

- (a) Each retiree selected for recruiting work should meet the following characteristics:
 - Retired from the Agency with an unblemished and generally outstanding record.
 - Retired from the Agency with a positive and enthusiastic attitude toward the Agency.
 - Meets people well; makes a good impression.
 - Has a record of good judgment about people.
- (b) Each retiree selected for recruiting work should ideally be identified shortly before retirement and then given a special short period of instruction (maybe only for a day or two) in how to approach this kind of work.

- (c) Each retiree selected for this kind of work should be given a kit of materials including such routine items as brochures on the Agency, suggested topics and texts for talks to civic clubs and campus audiences, etc.--and short forms to use in reporting on good individual contacts.
- (d) Each retiree selected for recruiting work should be on an informal year-to-year contract, retained for each additional year only if past performance in this activity has been meritorious, and probably not renewed beyond five years after retirement except in unusual circumstances. People retired for more than five years will probably remember an Agency not entirely like whatever the Agency has become in the meantime. However, periodic meetings for the retiree recruiters back at headquarters, and occasional contact with field representatives visiting from headquarters, can help to keep the retiree recruiters up-to-date.
- (e) Most retirees selected for recruiting work would probably be able and willing to handle most of these tasks on a no-pay basis except for coverage of travel costs to points requiring air flights and/or overnight stays out of the retired person's immediate area of residence.

Frankly, my "model" for this proposal to use Agency "alumni" retirees in the recruiting effort is based in large part on the success of Scott Breckinridge in my area of central [redacted] Scott retired as the Agency's Deputy IG in the summer of 1979 (after having received two Distinguished Intelligence Medal awards within recent years before retirement). He moved to his original hometown of [redacted] where I involved him in work on my University [redacted] campus. Students coming to me seeking advice on federal service careers, including the possibility of intelligence work, were referred by me to Scott--who in turn often spent many hours talking to the ones among these kids who made a good impression on him. Due to his referrals, I am under the impression that some of these are now being given strong consideration by the Agency. Furthermore, Scott has accepted invitations to appear as a speaker before many local groups such as the Rotary Club, church organizations, campus organizations, etc. Finally, in Fall Semester 1980, he will teach a new course for the Department of Political Science at the University [redacted] that has been named "The U.S. Intelligence System," and 55 students have eagerly pre-registered for it.

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In summary, the ablest of the retirees can perform many useful tasks in the recruiting effort within their various local communities across the nation, ranging from "institutional advertising" in the form of talks to local groups of all kinds, up to and including a great deal of contact work such as in-depth unhurried pre-screening interviews. This kind of "in situ" interviewing in a candidate's

hometown or general hometown area can be less intimidating to the candidate as an initial contact with the Agency, and can also uncover the candidate's strengths and weaknesses more revealingly, than the constrained and somewhat artificial environment of an initial interview at Agency headquarters. Finally, if a candidate is ultimately selected for further processing at headquarters, the local retiree recruiter can remain in contact with the candidate back in his/her hometown, and help to solve such problems as a candidate's impatience with whatever may be happening to his/her file back at headquarters. The local retiree on the other side of the coin can help to "soften the blow" for the losers who are not offered employment, such that those losing candidates still retain a measure of good will toward the Agency.

6. Agency "alumni" retirees as contacts with professors. The IG Report on page 46 notes that professors are one of the five best initial categories for recommending the Agency to prospective candidates. On page 54 this comment is further elaborated to suggest that graduate school professors are particularly useful in this regard. Stan Turner has introduced a number of devices that have been most helpful in rebuilding good will between senior academic administrators and faculty members on the one hand, and the Agency on the other. But, supplementing all of those measures (which are good, and ought to be continued and expanded), appropriate retirees can be extremely useful. The retirees who move back to their hometowns across the nation will often have good previous contacts with universities and colleges in those hometown areas--perhaps even is a graduate of one or more of those schools, and will certainly have old hometown friends who are graduates of the schools. This kind of retiree can be highly effective in dropping around for informal visits with professors, renewing old contacts, making new ones, and in all of this activity immeasurably improve the stature of the Agency in the eyes of those faculty members. This in itself can be very valuable is increasing the likelihood that a professor contacted in this fashion will think to suggest to his/her best students that they consider Agency employment following graduation. Again, my ideal "model" here is the kind of work that Scott Breckinridge has performed on the University campus. With a little encouragement and guidance from headquarters, Scott could be even more effective. -- Of course, I have no idea how many people such as Scott Breckinridge you may have in cities across America, but I urge you to find out and to start utilizing this extremely valuable resource in the various ways suggested herein. At relatively little cost in time, money and effort at headquarters, these people could save you a great deal of time, money and effort in identifying and processing good candidates. Let me stress that I think this kind of use of retirees should be equally applicable at the clerical levels, for example, using your retired top secretaries to help in identifying and interviewing prospective new-hire secretaries.

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7. Interviewing. I strongly support the notion in the IG Report that the initial-contact interviewing should serve to screen out far more people, so that the personnel processing system will not be clogged with so many candidates who turn out to be losers.

The use of "alumni" retirees for much of this initial pre-screening, as suggested in the previous pages of this memo, could be very helpful to you in this regard. But you will still get the walk-in candidates, particularly at the Washington Area Recruiting Office (WARO), who must be dealt with. For these walk-in candidates, you might be able to adopt/adapt a system that I have evolved for similar applicants at the graduate school which I head at the University [redacted]. It is a three-stage process:

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- (a) The first contact is with our front-office secretary, who has been trained to spend about 10 minutes with each walk-in applicant, filling out a short one-page form while talking to the person, but also making an initial judgment based on several basic criteria. If the applicant fails to meet any of these criteria, the secretary in a very pleasant way tells them they are most unlikely to be admissible at this school, while positively giving them other alternatives to explore. But, for those who meet the criteria (and those who don't but who can't be scared off by the secretary), the secretary refers them to the second-stage interview in an office down the hall. However, the secretary goes to that office first, and alone, to tell that second-stage interviewer her impressions of the applicant and to pass along the simple one-page fact form.
- (b) The second-stage interview is with my executive assistant, who is a very able lady with a Ph.D. and with faculty teaching experience. She takes about 20-30 minutes to dig into the applicant's substantive education and work experience backgrounds, while also ascertaining levels of maturity and commitment, etc. She then tries to scare away those who seem unlikely to meet all of our expectations while passing along to me the ones who look good at that point. Again, she comes to me first, leaving the applicant waiting in another office, to give me about a 60-second brief on her views of the person.
- (c) The third-stage interview is with me, and I continue the probe for strengths and weaknesses. I spend ordinarily not more than 15-20 minutes with the applicant but, for those who continue to look promising, I encourage them to drop by our nearby student lounge to talk with any of our students who may be sitting there.

We successfully scare away most applicants at the first or second stage of this interview process but, even for those who make it through all three stages, the total elapsed time is only about one hour, and it is the best hour we spend because we make the crucial decisions at that time. If the application file of papers which we eventually receive from determined applicants supports what we learned in the

STAT interview process, we can ordinarily take almost immediate action once the paper file is complete. (I should add that we also seek the opinions of any of our current students who may have talked to the walk-in applicants, but the contact with the current students also helps the prospective applicant to decide whether he/she really wants to be a [] student with us.)

We use essentially the same process when we receive an application file of papers before we ever see a prospective applicant in person. But, in those cases, we discourage candidates from visiting us on campus if their files are weak--indeed, we ordinarily reject them on the evidence in the file without even raising the possibility of an interview.

8. Training. I strongly support the general thrust of the remarks in the IG Report on this point. As I have commented at some length in previous memos to the DCI over the past three-plus years, I am convinced that the Agency has a good in-service training program, but that it could be a lot better--and should be a lot better to meet the foreseeable challenges ahead. There are basically only two ways to fight the Peter Principle: (a) the best possible pre-employment screening, to get only the best people in the first place; (b) the best possible in-service educational and training programs on a through-career basis.

Two obvious circumstances dictate having an elaborate and carefully conceived in-service through-career education and training program. First, the pace of change at the national and international levels is so rapid that any person is likely to become "obsolete" within a few years in the absence of periodic and appropriate training and/or education. Second, the requirements of successive new assignments throughout a career will include new kinds of knowledge and skills not needed and probably not experienced at earlier levels.

Of course, it's possible to argue against my logic here. A very good illustration is the case of the U.S. Navy, which has never much believed in in-service through-career education and training, but--to the extent that it does subscribe to this idea--almost always means training even when it says education. ("Training" is instruction in a specific set of skills for an immediately following job. "Education" is exposure to a wide-ranging set of perspectives, analytical approaches, and substantive knowledge likely to be valuable in many jobs over subsequent years.) The point can be illustrated with some comparisons between the U.S. Army and the Navy (with the Air Force more closely resembling the Army than the Navy). During the period from the wind-down of the Korean War (roughly 1954) to the wind-up of the Vietnam War (roughly 1964), the Army was sending from 375 to 400 of its best middle-grade officers to the best civilian graduate schools each year, often for doctoral-level work. Meanwhile,

the Navy was annually sending somewhere between zero and six of its officers to such schools, and only for terminal M.A.-level work. Both the Army and Air Force each has literally dozens of general officers with doctoral degrees from the best civilian schools, whereas the Navy has had only one unrestricted-line admiral over the entire history of the Navy who had an earned doctoral degree from a respected graduate school. [Parenthetically, the only member of the JCS ever to hold a Ph.D. is the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Lew Allen, who has a doctorate in physics.] It is virtually mandatory for Army officers to have attended both a command and staff school and also a senior war college in order to be promoted to general officer rank, but such credentials are not only not necessary in the Navy--they may even be a handicap--in the competition for promotion to flag rank.

Furthermore, it's no mystery that most of the senior officers who have been prominent on the White House staff and in the JCS arena have been Army and Air Force generals, rarely Navy admirals. One thinks, for example, of GEN Andy Goodpaster (Army, and Princeton Ph.D.), and LG John Pustay, currently the EA to the C/JCS (Air Force, and GSIS Denver Ph.D.). Similarly, it's no mystery that the many books on national security and foreign policy issues which have been written and published by U.S. military officers over the past 30+ years have been produced by Army and Air Force people, virtually never by Navy people.

But the Navy counters my arguments by saying that naval officers are just as capable and perform just as well in top policy jobs as do the Army and Air Force officers. They also contend that the pattern of civilian staffing on the Naval Academy faculty, and the need for the best officers to go to sea, prevent the Navy from having the same kind of emphasis on in-service through-career education and training programs as one can find in the Army and Air Force--even if the Navy wanted such programs. The fact, however, is that the Navy never has wanted such programs, and no reasonably objective civilian executive in government who has had an opportunity to compare the performances of admirals versus generals in top policy jobs would rate the admirals over the generals. At the extreme, one can even notice what can happen at the highest level of government in connection with foreign policy and national security affairs when an incumbent never took a course in international relations, never learned a foreign language, and never lived overseas or had any other significant international experience prior to taking office.

In summary on this point, I return to my original logic. The Agency needs and ought to have a much more elaborate and carefully articulated in-service through-career education and training program. This is not the place to offer a full-scale blueprint for such an operation, but--as I have argued in many of my earlier memos for three-plus years--it is high time that somebody started drafting and implementing a blueprint.

Ultimately, the only argument for an intelligence service is that it is better to be intelligent and informed, than unintelligent and uninformed. It would therefore be an extreme anomalous irony if people in the intelligence business resisted education and training programs that could make them more intelligent.

9. PATB. The subject of testing has always been controversial almost everywhere, at least in American society, and doubtless will continue to be. There are several reasons for this:

- (a) First, Americans are by political ideology committed to egalitarian practices. But testing seems to screen out many Americans at relatively early levels in life and thus denies them further opportunities for the big and prestigious career patterns. Everybody can ordinarily name at least one friend or acquaintance who was a "late bloomer," but late bloomers often get no chance in an environment dominated by testing at early stages. It is this egalitarian impulse which seems to be at the heart of Ralph Nader's continuing criticisms of the standardized testing industry, particularly against the Educational Testing Service of Princeton (ETS is the dominant giant in the industry). Nader wants to open up the whole testing process so that the losers will gain evidence with which to fight the results of a test. Of course, this would also help to make work for whole new legions of lawyers, and Nader is a lawyer. Nader would like a world in which there are no losers.
- (b) Second, it is very hard to "prove" in any scientific fashion that one test is "better" than another. Thus, some extremists try to apply a strictly utilitarian criterion. For example, if one could show a high correlation between skills in playing the banjo and performance as a law school student, then a banjo recital would be as useful as the LSAT in determining admissions to law schools. Whatever works, works--and, as Bert Lance said, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." But the extremists have an even stronger argument, they think, when they note how hard it is to prove that any particular testing instrument is better than another. It's somewhat like trying to prove that nuclear deterrence has worked, which involves trying to show why all the wars that have not happened therefore did not happen. Similarly, it is hard to demonstrate that all of the people screened out of jobs would have necessarily performed less well in those jobs than those who were hired. The trouble with the extremists' arguments, however, is that they logically extend to a case against almost any testing or the equivalent--which is to say that one test is as good as another.

There is perhaps a further reason why standardized testing has come under attack even from some of its practitioners, and this has to do with the people who are heavily involved in the testing business. These people tend to be drawn from psychiatrists and psychologists in disproportionate numbers. As for psychiatrists, any good medical school dean would tell you in private (and I have talked to many such

deans) that the med students who eventually opt for the specialization in psychiatry tend to be drawn disproportionately from those whose grades were barely good enough to get into med school and whose grades later were barely good enough to graduate from med school. This is not to say that psychiatrists are necessarily "dumber" than people in other fields of medical specialization, but it does say that they are people who have never done nearly as well on tests as their peers and who therefore perhaps have a bias against tests. As for psychologists, the branch of psychology which has dominated testing is the field known as psychometrics, and those people have often been narrow-minded intellectual bigots with considerable technical skill but very little substantive knowledge in depth or breadth in the behavioral sciences. Thus, for example, whenever a forensic psychologist or forensic psychiatrist appears in a court case for one side, the other side can and does almost always produce a similar witness with apparently equal or better professional credentials.

All of the above is merely to say that you can expect a first-class controversy if you should endeavor to move away from the PATB that has been used here for sometime. The people who run the PATB for you will swear that it's the best device, or at least as good as any other, and they will be able to produce witnesses on their behalf while trying to discredit any witnesses against the PATB. But I think they will be wrong.

Indeed, when the DCI asked me several summers ago to take a look at the PATB, I strongly concluded then that it was an obsolete instrument flawed in many ways, failing to test for what you should be testing for, and revealing very little of value. The new IG Report is directly in line with my conclusions, and I believe that the IG Report has consulted the most respected advisors. I happen to think that standardized testing performs a very valuable service in American education and in organizations which use it as part of the hiring process. The testing industry has become far more subtle, knowledgeable and experienced over the past quarter of a century. There is a fairly strong consensus on what is, and what is not, a good testing instrument, depending (of course) on what you are trying to measure. If there was any way that you could submit your PATB to a representative cross-section of experienced and knowledgeable people in the testing industry, while trying to disguise the origins of the test instruments and the organization which uses these instruments, I am persuaded that something over 90% of respondents in this kind of survey would support the IG Report.

But, needless to say, you will not be able to take such a poll, and you will stir up as much controversy internally as you would get from the Air Force if you argued that we no longer need an Air Force. So, as is so often the case in modern American life, non-experts in the top decisionmaking jobs will have to make a decision between the conflicting claims from two rival groups of alleged experts.

You cannot duck this decision, and I urge you to go with the IG Report. But, if you wanted a compromise middle ground, you could "test the testers," so to speak, by introducing an experimental program for perhaps three years, whereby roughly half of the new recruits would come in via the PATB route, and the other via the alternative testing procedures suggested by the IG Report. You could view either group as the control group but, in either case, you would accumulate data to suggest to you whether either group performed significantly better on the job than the other. Or, as the Defense Department might say, you could set up your own "fly before buy" comparison program. If the results from the two groups turned out to be roughly the same, then you try banjo recitals. But I am persuaded that the route suggested by the IG Report will give you new people who turn out to meet all of your requirements and expectations significantly better than what you have gotten in the past. At the same time, as a caveat, I would also argue that you ought to review whatever testing instrument and procedures that you use at not greater than five-year intervals, because testing is a dynamic endeavor (part science and perhaps part art) which is likely to make improvements as years go by. It is based in the behavioral sciences which continue to make substantial strides.

10. The line concept. Perhaps the biggest single recommendation in the IG Report is to make the personnel business here a major line management responsibility. As I said much earlier in this memo, I strongly support this idea, for all of the reasons given in the IG Report, and some others that I could cite.

This does not mean, however, that I would favor disbanding your Personnel Department and allowing each Agency subunit to become a separate little empire without any requirement to be responsive to centralized personnel suggestions. I do believe that personnel work has become a respected professional field with valuable contributions to make. Without it, you would run the risk of a proliferation of old-buddy networks within your various line units, and some other risks too. But heavy if not exclusive reliance on a personnel department poses risks in the other direction, such as a predominance of new hires based on technical considerations peculiar to the personnel business but quite possibly irrelevant to the tasks and career tracks for which people are hired in the intelligence business.

A mixed personnel system might well be the best compromise. This would include a Personnel Department staffed almost equally by professional personnel specialists on the one hand, and by line people rotated into personnel (for perhaps three to five year terms) on the other hand. I have seen this kind of mixed system work very effectively in many successful organizations, perhaps most notably at Citicorp (earlier known as First National City Bank of New York--

and recently named the largest bank in the world, based on profits if not also on assets). The crucial final-stage interviewing of prospective hires for junior executive track openings at Citicorp has typically been done by a team of four people at least one but not more than two of whom were personnel specialists while the others were line people rotated into personnel for a period. But each line operating unit has been supposed to generate and pre-screen candidates for this kind of final-stage interview, and each operating unit has retained the ultimate authority to decide whether it wanted people guided to it by this process.

Again, one must always be somewhat skeptical about even one's own judgments in this area. For example, even while I say to you that the Citicorp system has been a great success, telling you that it is now the biggest bank in the world, it's also important to note that Citicorp is entering some very heavy weather based partly on earlier management decisions that appear in retrospect to have been less than prudent. Possibly the key variable at Citicorp was not the new people they were acquiring at the bottom over the past 15-20 years or so, but rather the dynamic chairman and chief executive officer George Moore at the top--who was clearly the dominant leader. It is possible that a good leader can get top performance from any kind of reasonably well qualified employees. It is also possible that not even George Moore was a genius, because he was fortunate to be able to lead Citicorp to its great growth during a period now widely perceived as a strong "bull market." Quoting one friend of mine (who happens to be a vice president at Chase Manhattan, which now looks better after more than a decade of chasing Citicorp), "Any fool can look good in a bull market--but it's something else again to look good in a bear market." And we are definitely in a bear market for the foreseeable future in the United States if not also elsewhere, in almost all public and private sectors.

Even at an operation as apparently successful as Citicorp, I have been amazed at some personnel practices. For example, I once challenged Citicorp executives to show me evidence why the big majority of their new hires for junior executive track openings were graduates of the Harvard Business School. I told them that I did not doubt the abilities of the Harvard "B" School people, but I asked if they had done any systematic comparisons of the on-the-job performance records of people from the "B" School in contrast to those hired from diverse other sources. They were puzzled at my question, since "everybody knows the "B" School is the best in the field." They had no such evidence as I had asked for--they were operating merely within their own folklore. Now, the Harvard "B" School is going through an agonizing reappraisal, the Stanford Business School is generally regarded as the best in the field, Citicorp has now developed the comparative studies that I had requested, and it has strongly diversified its sources for

new hires for junior executive track slots.

The moral of this Citicorp story is that it is always important for any large bureaucratized organization to reexamine its main operating assumptions, its folklore, its conventional wisdom. But it's also important to note some basic differences between a private sector organization such as Citicorp, and a public sector organization such as the Agency. The Agency cannot control who its top management will be--this is of course determined within the political process. Thus, the Agency cannot always count on having a great leader such as George Moore at the top. And public sector organizations lack the constant and terrifying discipline of the marketplace which tends to identify and terminate inept leaders fairly promptly. A public sector organization therefore has all the more reason to develop the strongest possible system in the personnel area, because only the best personnel can carry an organization over those periods of inept or inappropriate leadership supplied by the political process. If the bureaucratic employees of a public agency lapse into lethargy and forego continuing efforts to improve their personnel practices, they have abandoned their only possible anchor against the ravages which can be expected under occasionally weak top leadership derived from the political process. Of course, public agencies are rarely put totally out of business, but they can experience reorganizations which may amount to the same thing, or can be bypassed and side-tracked by more talented competitor groups. Only top-quality career personnel can stand a chance of avoiding these problems.

The kind of personnel system called for by the IG Report will not necessarily result in a less expensive operation, but it should enhance the chances of getting better people. I would see a continuing need for a specialized Personnel Department, to play the following (among other) roles:

- (a) To serve as a continuing teacher and consultant to the line units in operating their various personnel programs.
- (b) To impose a minimum of centralized personnel policies on the line units, on behalf of top management.
- (c) To gather and maintain centralized personnel records and files, as part of centralized monitoring of personnel programs within the line units.
- (d) To assist in the task of identifying candidates, screening and processing candidates, etc.

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Because of the brief period that I will be here, I have not taken time to organize my thoughts and comments in this memo in the most systematic and efficacious manner. Rather, I have simply shotgunned


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a miscellaneous array of reactions at you, and you can make whatever of it that might be useful. Apologies, also, for typo errors, spelling errors, errors in grammar and syntax, etc.--I have cranked this out of my typewriter at breakneck speed.



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XC: DCI Turner
IG Briggs



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